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Manipulation is a means by which a person is gotten to do something that the person was not 
initially inclined to do. As such, it is a form of power. Distinguishing it from other forms of 
power, such as persuasion, coercion, and physical force, is both important and difficult. It is 
important because it often matters which form of power a political actor uses, and manipulation 
is commonly thought to be a form of power whose exercise is undesirable. It is difficult because 
the line between manipulation and persuasion is often obscure, and because the term 
manipulation can be applied to tactics that influence the target’s state of mind, and tactics that 
change the target’s situation. Political theorists and philosophers have offered several accounts of 
manipulation: Some see it as deceptive influence, some see it as covert influence, some see it as 
influence with covert intent, some see it as offering bad reasons, and some see it as changing the 
external situation. While each of these approaches gets some things right about manipulation, 
each faces important challenges as well. 
One reason why manipulation seems undesirable is that it appears to undermine autonomy. This 
fact helps explain why concerns about manipulation arise in discussions of “nudges” that are 
meant to improve people’s decision making without coercion. Even if nudges benefit their 
targets, they may be undesirable on balance if they involve autonomy-undermining 
manipulation. 
Manipulation is a useful tool for autocrats, but it poses serious problems for democracies. This is 
because it appears to undermine the consent on which democratic legitimacy depends. Some 
political theorists argue that the problems posed by manipulation can be best addressed through 
deliberative democracy. Others dispute this suggestion. At the level of practice, there is reason to 
worry that late-20th- and 21st-century developments in psychology and the social and 
information sciences, as well as changes to the media landscape, threaten to make manipulation 
more prevalent and effective. 
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Manipulation in Politics 
Alan Ware (1981) wrote that the concept of manipulation is “of central importance in democratic 
theory,” but that “it remains one of the least studied of the concepts that are usually recognized 
as members of the power or control ‘family’” (p. 163). In the decades after Ware’s remark, a 
great deal more work has been done on the concept of manipulation, both by political theorists 
and by philosophers. Nevertheless, Ware’s assessment still rings true: Much more work remains 
to be done. 
To begin, it will be helpful to have some examples of political phenomena to which the term 
manipulation is commonly applied: 
• A candidate tarnishes his competitor with innuendoes, suggesting that he is soft on crime 
or likely to start a war. 
• A candidate deliberately conceals the fact that, if elected, he will support a policy that 
most voters oppose. 
• A leader appeals to xenophobia to garner support for restrictive immigration policies or 
an aggressive military action. 
• Legislators investigate the leader of a rival party on corruption charges they know to be 
baseless, hoping that the mere fact of an investigation will lead voters to question his 
integrity. 
• The dominant party redraws electoral districts to concentrate voters from the opposing 
party into a number of districts that is smaller than the opposing party’s proportion of the 
electorate. 
• Legislators attach a “poison pill” or “wrecking amendment” to a piece of legislation they 
oppose, making it so unappealing that its supporters vote it down. 
• A chairperson carefully arranges a series of votes to maximize the chances of obtaining 
the outcome that the chairperson favors. 
These examples all involve manipulation in politics where “politics” is construed very 
narrowly. But if “politics” is construed more broadly to include economic relationships, then 
examples like this might also count as political manipulation: 
• An advertiser employs clever psychological appeals to induce consumers to feel self-
conscious about some aspect of their appearance that the product being advertised is 
designed to enhance. 
If “politics” is construed even more broadly to include social and interpersonal interactions, 
then most, if not all, forms of ordinary, everyday manipulation might also be instances of 
political manipulation: 
• A child nags his parents to buy him an ice cream. 
• A group of adolescents employs peer pressure to enforce conformity with the group’s 
norms. 
• One spouse induces the other to feel inappropriate guilt in order to get their way. 
This list is certainly incomplete, and further reflection might suggest that some items on it 
are not really examples of manipulation after all. However, it should serve to illustrate the 
variety of tactics that might plausibly be regarded as examples of political manipulation. 
Manipulation and Power 
According to the classic definition of power put forward by Robert Dahl (1957), “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202–
203). On this view, manipulation is a form of power, since, whatever else it may be, 
manipulation is a way of getting a person to do something that the person was not initially 
inclined to do. Dahl’s definition of power is sufficiently broad to include physical force, 
coercion, manipulation, and rational persuasion. There are, of course, important normative 
differences among these forms of power: It matters quite a lot whether a government uses 
coercion or rational persuasion to achieve some policy objective, for example. It is relatively 
straightforward to give a rough characterization of coercion, rational persuasion, and physical 
force. Manipulation is more elusive. Although the distinction between manipulation and physical 
force seems clear enough, the lines between manipulation and coercion and between 
manipulation and persuasion are more difficult to draw. 
This problem is compounded because the term manipulation can be used to describe two 
very different strategies for getting someone to do something. Consider this example from 
philosopher Joel Rudinow (1978): 
Smith presents himself to the admitting officer at the psychiatric clinic, . . . saying 
that he has just had another terrible battle with his wife and claiming that if he is 
not admitted he will . . . wind up drunk, brawling, and finally either in the 
emergency ward or in jail. The admitting officer refuses his request, explaining that 
to admit Smith . . . would constitute inappropriate use of already overburdened 
facilities. Smith responds, “All right then, . . . I will climb to the top of the water 
tower and create such a scene that you'll have to admit me,” and departs. Half an 
hour later Smith reappears at the admitting officer’s desk, this time escorted by 
policemen, who report having “talked him down” from the water tower and suggest 
that he be admitted overnight for observation. Smith is admitted. . . . It seems 
intuitively beyond question that Smith had successfully attempted to manipulate 
not only the admitting officer but the policemen. (p. 340) 
Rudinow’s case illustrates two very different ways that a person can be gotten to do something, 
both of which seem aptly described as manipulation. Smith manipulates the police officers by 
changing their state of mind to make them believe that he is a suicide risk. But he manipulates 
the clinic’s admitting officer by arranging the situation in such a way that he gets what he wants. 
Thus, it appears that the term manipulation can be applied to two rather different ways that 
Smith can try to get his way: by influencing the state of mind of the person whose decision will 
get him what he wants, and by changing the situation so that he gets what he wants. Let us call 
these forms of manipulation psychological and situational, respectively. 
Both forms of manipulation occur in the political realm. Two of the most famous—or 
infamous—political advertisements in U.S. history are the Willie Horton ad and the Daisy ad. 
The first was used during the 1988 U.S. election between George Bush Sr. and Michael Dukakis; 
it involved an African American man convicted of murder who committed additional violent 
crimes when furloughed under a Massachusetts program while Michael Dukakis was governor. 
The second was used during the 1964 election between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater; it 
showed a small child counting flowers just before a nuclear explosion, with a voiceover 
insinuating that Goldwater was likely to start a nuclear war. These two ads, which are often cited 
as examples of manipulation (Klemp, 2011), clearly fall into the category of psychological 
manipulation. 
But tactics like wrecking amendments, dividing an opposing coalition, gerrymandering, and 
engineering the order of a series of votes to shape the outcome are also often described as forms 
of manipulation. These tactics do not work by influencing the targets’ mental state. Rather, they 
operate, as William Riker (1986) put it, by “structuring the world so you can win” (p. ix). Thus, 
they would seem to fall into the category of situational manipulation. 
A closer look at these examples reveals that situational manipulation itself seems to include 
two rather different kinds of tactics. In Rudinow’s example, Smith gets his way by changing the 
situation so that the admitting officer has no viable alternative but to do what Smith wants him to 
do. Wrecking amendments seem to operate like this: They change the situation so that it is no 
longer viable for those who support a piece of legislation to continue to do so. In both cases, the 
changes to the situation induce someone to change their decision. But other tactics that seem to 
be examples of situational manipulation work instead by changing the rules or procedures in 
such a way that the manipulator gets what the manipulator wants without having to change 
anyone’s decisions. Gerrymandering, for example, does not change anyone’s decisions; rather, it 
changes the rules in such a way that the gerrymanderers get what they want. The difference 
between these two forms of situational manipulation involves whether they are mediated by 
anyone changing their mind: In the first form, changing the situation makes it rational for the 
target of manipulation to choose the way the manipulator wants. In the second, changing the 
situation in and of itself is sufficient to ensure that things go the way that the manipulator wants. 
The existence of both psychological manipulation and situational manipulation, and the 
distinction between the two kinds of situational manipulation, complicate attempts to distinguish 
manipulation from other ways of getting someone to do X rather than Y. Any attempt to 
characterize manipulation will assume or imply some claim about the relationship between 
psychological and situational manipulation: Are they manifestations of the same phenomenon, 
closely related phenomena, or distinct and unrelated phenomena to which the same word just 
happens to be applied? Moreover, are forms of situational manipulation where changing the 
situation induces a change in behavior more like situational manipulation because they involve 
changing the situation, or more like psychological manipulation because they change someone’s 
behavior? 
In addition to distinguishing it from other forms of power or influence, a theory of 
manipulation should also illuminate its normative status. Manipulation is generally regarded as 
an undesirable thing; the term “manipulation” has a negative connotation that the term 
“influence” lacks. One important question facing theorists is whether to take the negative 
connotation of “manipulation” as a datum to guide theorizing, so that the common disapproval of 
manipulation and being manipulated is taken to be a fact that an adequate account of 
manipulation must explain (Baron, 2014), or whether to treat “manipulation” as a purely 
descriptive term that names some phenomenon which will then be subjected to an independent 
moral analysis (Wood, 2014). 
A related question concerns how much continuity should be required between a concept of 
political manipulation and the use of the term “manipulation” in ordinary discourse. Should 
theorists treat “manipulation” as a technical term and stipulate that it refers to some theoretically 
interesting phenomenon, or should they rely on how the term is used in ordinary discourse to see 
whether it applies to various political phenomena? This question is complicated by the fact that 
the term “political” can be used very narrowly to include only “what politicians do,” or so widely 
as to include any form of influence between persons. If “political” is defined to cover any use of 
power, and if “power” is defined broadly enough to include manipulation, then it would seem 
that manipulation is always political. This fact suggests that any attempt to limit the scope of the 
term “political manipulation” in a way that sharply distinguishes it from more ordinary forms of 
manipulation like those that occur within families or between private individuals would need to 
be justified. In the absence of such a justification, it seems difficult to draw a sharp line between 
political manipulation and ordinary, everyday manipulation. 
These questions are all theoretical. But answering them will help us address more practical 
questions: How do various forms of manipulation work? What effect does manipulation have on 
political institutions, especially democratic ones? Assuming that manipulation is often 
undesirable, how can its frequency and its effects on politics be reduced? When do attempts to 
employ psychological findings to help effect political change or increase social welfare cross the 
line between morally benign influence and morally dubious manipulation? 
Characterizing Manipulation 
Any attempt to characterize and understand manipulation should identify some feature or set of 
features shared by all instances of manipulation. These features should explain why instances of 
influence with those features count as manipulation rather than some other form of power or 
influence. This process might result in deciding that some putative examples of manipulation are 
either not manipulation at all or that they are instances of a distinct form of manipulation. In 
particular, theorists will need to settle the question of the relationship between psychological and 
situational manipulation (and between the two forms of situational manipulation). There are two 
strategies for doing this. One would be to assume that situational and psychological manipulation 
are instances of the same phenomenon and seek features present in both but absent in other forms 
of power or influence. The other would be to investigate each one separately and then figure out 
whether they are instances of the same phenomenon later, after a good understanding of each has 
been achieved. 
The accounts of political manipulation put forward by the early 21st century can be divided 
into five main categories: those that characterize manipulation as deceptive influence, those that 
characterize it as covert influence, those that characterize it as influence with covert intent, those 
that characterize it as influence via bad reasons, and those that characterize it as influence that 
operates by changing the external situation. 
Manipulation as Deceptive Influence 
In his book Manipulatory Politics, Robert Goodin (1980) proposed an influential account of 
political manipulation as deceptive influence. He wrote that manipulation “is power exercised (1) 
deceptively and (2) against the putative will of its objects” (Goodin, 1980, p. 8). According to 
Goodin (1980), manipulation operates in such a way that the target is unaware of what is 
happening: “In the strongest sense, ‘manipulation’ is something which actually happens 
invisibly” (p. 9). For Goodin, manipulation “involves bending another’s will” (Goodin, 1980, p. 
18), deflecting the target from what he was initially going to do—what Goodin called his 
“putative will”—to what the manipulator wants him to do. According to Goodin, the test for 
whether an influence is manipulative involves two conditions: “1. Is the interference deceptive? 
2. Is the interference contrary to the putative will of those subject to it?” (Goodin, 1980, p. 35). 
Goodin showed how this definition applies to many tactics that seem like paradigm 
instances of manipulation: lies, deception, rhetorical tricks, and other methods of making things 
seem other than they really are, when such tactics are used to steer the target away from the 
target’s “putative will,” namely, away from the decision that the target would have made but for 
the manipulation. 
An important challenge to Goodin’s proposal is that it is not clear that all forms of 
manipulation are deceptive in the way that Goodin’s theory requires. Appeals to emotion that 
would normally be described as manipulative, for example, do not always involve deception. It is 
difficult to see anything deceptive about the appeal to fear in the Daisy ad, yet it is often treated 
as a paradigm example of political manipulation. This difficulty is compounded if continuity 
between the political concept of manipulation and the more everyday use of that term is a 
requirement, or even a desideratum, of an adequate theory of political manipulation. Nagging 
and peer pressure are commonly regarded as forms of manipulation, but they do not seem to 
involve deception. Or consider the influence tactic known as “social proof,” which exploits the 
human tendency to follow the crowd. Presumably, this tactic can sometimes be manipulative—
its use in Nazi Germany and by Jim Jones’s People’s Temple seem like clear examples of 
manipulation. But there seems to be nothing deceptive about exploiting this tendency to do as 
others do. 
The account faces further challenges if it is important for a concept of political manipulation 
to apply to both psychological and situational manipulation. If gerrymandering or wrecking 
amendments are manipulative, then it does not seem that this status depends on their being 
deceptive. Of course, as Goodin (1980, pp. 15, 31) noted, it is undoubtedly easier to get away 
with such tactics if one is deceptive about them. But if gerrymandering or wrecking amendments 
are manipulative in and of themselves, then it seems reasonable to think that they should remain 
so even when done openly. 
Manipulation as Covert Influence 
Some political theorists characterize manipulation as covert influence. An early version of this 
approach was proposed by Alan Ware (1981, pp. 165–166), who provided four conditions for it 
to be true that A manipulated B: 
1. A’s intervention successfully changes B’s “tastes, lifestyle, values,” or the goods B 
chooses, or the reasons he chooses them, or the weight that those reasons carry in his 
decision making. 
2. A restricts or “structures” B’s alternatives to increase the probability that B will choose as 
A wishes. To illustrate what he means by “structures,” Ware offers the example of A 
withholding information from B (Ware, 1981, p. 173). This suggests that “structuring” is 
not something that A does to B’s options themselves, but something that A does to the 
psychological processes by which B chooses among them. 
3. B either has no knowledge of, or does not understand, the ways in which A affects his 
choices. 
4. A moral agent in A’s position would normally be held morally responsible for all the 
results of structuring the alternatives facing B. 
According to Ware (1981, p. 168), the distinguishing feature of manipulation is that it is 
covert in the sense that targets are unaware of how they are being influenced. Ware’s inclusion 
of both “structuring” options and limiting them as mechanisms for manipulation is presumably 
intended to handle cases of both psychological and situational manipulation (or at least forms of 
situational manipulation in which one changes a person’s situation to influence that person’s 
choice). 
Keith Dowding (2011) offered this summary of a view like Ware’s: 
Both force and influence are overt: the actor being forced or influenced is usually 
aware that of being subject to this pressure [sic] . . . Manipulation, however, is 
normally thought to be carried out behind the back of the subject, so to speak. . . . 
We might define manipulation in the following manner: A manipulates B by getting 
B to choose something B would not otherwise have done by restricting B's 
alternatives in some manner, where B does not understand that A is thus affecting 
his or her choice. The restriction on the alternatives of B might be a physical 
reduction in them—forcing B into a restricted choice set. But often such 
manipulation occurs through B's lack of knowledge or information about the other 
alternatives. Indeed, restricting or affecting the information that the subject receives 
is the most discussed form of manipulation in the literature. (p. 398) 
In offering this paraphrase of Ware’s account (which Dowding cited) in his short encyclopedia 
article on manipulation, Dowding may be suggesting that this is the received view, or something 
near to it. 
A similar view is proposed by Daniel Susser et al. (2019), though their view does not 
include limiting options as one of the forms of manipulation. They wrote that “manipulation is 
hidden influence. . . . Covertly influencing someone—imposing a hidden influence—means 
influencing them in a way they aren’t consciously aware of, and in a way they couldn’t easily 
become aware of” (Susser et al., 2019, p. 4). 
Despite its appeal, the covert influence account of manipulation faces challenges similar to 
those facing the deceptive influence view. It is unclear that manipulation always involves the 
target’s lack of awareness of the influence. While situational manipulation like gerrymandering 
or wrecking amendments are often hidden, it is not clear that this is what makes them 
manipulative when they are hidden, or that they cease to be manipulative when done openly. 
And some ordinary forms of psychological manipulation, like nagging, peer pressure, guilt trips, 
and other plays on emotion appear to be manipulative even when—as is often the case—targets 
are well aware of the influences on their decision making. Moreover, manipulation of these kinds 
can still be effective despite being overt rather than covert. It is probably true that covert forms 
of manipulation are, ceteris paribus, more pernicious than overt forms, in part because they are 
more difficult to resist or guard against. But it seems difficult to maintain that influences like 
nagging, peer pressure, and guilt trips are not manipulative simply because they are overt . 
Manipulation as Influence with Covert Intent 
Closely related to the idea that manipulation is covert influence is the idea that it is influence 
with covert intent. On this view, the manipulative influence itself may or may not be hidden from 
the target, but the manipulator’s intent must be hidden. The philosopher Radim Bělohrad (2019) 
defended such a position, writing that: 
In manipulation, the influencer is keen to create an impression that her motives are 
very different from what she projects. . . . Manipulation essentially involves 
deception. The deception may occur in the content of the manipulative influence, 
as is the case in lying, for instance, but, more importantly, it occurs in the intentions 
of the manipulator. The manipulator always projects intentions that differ from her 
real intentions. (pp. 457–459) 
The political theorist Gregory Whitfield (2020) offered a similar theory: 
An act of manipulation is any intentional attempt by an agent (A) to cause another 
agent (B) to will/prefer/intend/act other than what A takes B’s will, preference or 
intention to be, where A does so utilizing methods that obscure and render deniable 
A’s intentions vis-à-vis B. 
Whitfield suggested that the covertness of the manipulator’s intentions distinguishes 
manipulation from other forms of power or influence. Although he counted deceptive tactics as 
forms of manipulative influence, he also regarded “altering either incentives or the structure an 
agent acts within in order to secure a preferred outcome” as “one of the central types of 
manipulation” (Whitfield, 2020). Whitfield contended that his analysis of manipulation applies 
to instances of psychological manipulation like misleading voters about an opponent, giving 
incorrect directions to the polling place to supporters of one’s rival, and so on, as well as 
instances of situational manipulation like strategic voting and gerrymandering. 
However, the covert intent approach faces significant challenges. Certainly, many instances 
of manipulation involve—and perhaps require—covert intentions. Iago’s manipulation of 
Othello likely required Iago’s true intention to remain hidden, to take a famous example. But 
many cases of ordinary manipulation do not seem to require the manipulator’s intentions to be 
hidden. The child nagging for ice cream clearly and transparently intends to get the adult to give 
them ice cream. The adolescents using peer pressure to induce a fellow to smoke clearly and 
transparently intend to get their fellow to light up. Despite the clear and obvious intentions, both 
of these seem like paradigm cases of manipulation. The case for thinking that the Willie Horton 
ad or the Daisy ad are manipulative seems strong despite the fact that the intentions behind 
them—to influence people to vote against Dukakis or Goldwater—were quite transparent. 
This problem seems even worse for instances of situational manipulation—especially those 
that change the outcome without changing anyone’s decisions. Whitfield’s view seems to imply 
that gerrymandering, for instance, is only manipulative if the perpetrators hide their intentions. 
But notice that this tells us nothing about why the gerrymandering itself is manipulative. If 
gerrymandering is a form of manipulation in and of itself, then why does it matter whether the 
politicians pretend to be innocent of any intent to gain a disproportionate number of legislative 
seats? Tying the question of whether gerrymandering is manipulative to whether the intent is 
hidden or blatant seems to miss the very things about gerrymandering that lead some people to 
count it as a form of manipulation, namely that it involves gaming the system by exploiting the 
rules, or loopholes in them, in ways that allow the manipulator to gain or exercise political power 
that has not been legitimately acquired. 
Of course, as a practical matter, those who engage in gerrymandering have reason to pretend 
that they intend only to engage in a non-partisan administrative cartographic exercise. Such 
pretenses are presumably manipulative. But the fact that it is advantageous to hide one’s 
intentions to take a certain action seems insufficient for pronouncing that action manipulative in 
and of itself. After all, it is generally advantageous to hide one’s intention to do anything that 
others are likely to find objectionable, be it gerrymandering or automobile theft. 
Perhaps aware of these worries, Whitfield (2020) sometimes fell back to a weaker position, 
claiming that manipulation only requires “plausible deniability” about one’s intentions. But this 
fallback only raises new questions without answering the main challenge. To whom must the 
deniability be plausible? How plausible must it be? Nor does it address the key challenge: If 
gerrymandering is a form of manipulation, then why should it only be so if the perpetrators have 
tried to hide what they are doing? Why should judgments about whether the Willie Horton or 
Daisy ads are manipulative depend on whether their creators did or could “plausibly deny” that 
they were trying to influence people’s votes? 
Manipulation as Offering Bad Reasons 
A rather different approach to manipulation characterizes it as an attempt to trick the target into 
acting for bad reasons. The philosopher Claudia Mills (1995) offered a straightforward version of 
this view: 
A manipulator tries to change another's beliefs and desires by offering her bad 
reasons, disguised as good, or faulty arguments, disguised as sound—where the 
manipulator himself knows these to be bad reasons and faulty arguments. . . . A 
manipulator is interested in reasons not as logical justifiers but as causal levers. For 
the manipulator, reasons are tools, and a bad reason can work as well as, or better 
than, a good one. (pp. 100–101) 
A similar view has been offered by James Fishkin (2011), who wrote: 
A person has been manipulated by a communication when she has been exposed to 
a message intended to change her views in a way she would not accept if she were 
to think about it on the basis of good conditions. (pp. 32–33, emphasis original) 
Robert Noggle (2020) argued that: 
manipulation is the attempt to get someone to adopt any faulty mental state: belief, 
desire, emotion, etc. Typically, the manipulator hopes that adopting the faulty 
mental state will lead the target to act in ways that the manipulator prefers. (p. 243, 
emphasis original) 
This can be seen as a version of the bad reasons approach inasmuch as getting someone to act on 
a faulty mental state like a false belief, an inappropriate or excessively strong emotion, or an 
irrational desire is tantamount to getting that person to act on a bad reason. 
The idea that manipulation involves tricking the target into acting on bad reasons can also be 
discerned in a pair of important papers by Keith Dowding. Dowding’s goal is to set out ideal 
conditions—which he calls “reliability conditions”—for persuasion in deliberative democracy. 
He claims that if these conditions are met, then the attempted persuasion is neither coercive nor 
manipulative. Although this is not quite a definition of manipulation, Dowding’s reliability 
conditions are sufficient for the absence of manipulation. Hence, they provide at least a partial 
and indirect characterization of manipulation. Dowding’s conditions apply when some 
influencer, i, offers some reason or evidence, E, to j, in order to get j to accept some claim about 
what is true or some proposal about what to do, S. According to Dowding, such an attempt at 
persuasion is neither coercive nor manipulative if the relevant “reliability conditions” are 
satisfied. 
The first reliability condition in (Dowding, 2016) is that: 
(1) the reasons (E) that lead i to assent to S must constitute the reasons that j has for 
assenting to S. (p. 6) 
This condition requires influencers to appeal only to considerations that they themselves regard 
as good reasons for the claim that they want the other person to accept. Thus, if the persuasion is 
successful, it will turn out that “both i and j believe S on roughly the same grounds” (Dowding, 
2016, p. 7). This condition trivially prohibits trying to convince someone of something one 
regards as false or unsupported by any reasons at all. Moreover, it prohibits doing what Mills 
(1995) saw as the hallmark of manipulation: offering bad reasons disguised as good. 
The second “reliability condition” is that: 
(2) i persuades j of S on grounds E with the intention that together they learn the truth 
or, in other contexts, come to some agreement. (Dowding, 2016, p. 7) 
The idea here is that the influencer must be guided by the intent to arrive at the truth or to come 
to some genuinely mutual agreement about what to do. Thus, influencers must refrain from 
treating their own beliefs as beyond question and from adopting an inflexible win-at-all-costs 
strategy in discussions about what to do. As Dowding (2016) put it, “Being honest and 
trustworthy involves a genuine desire to seek the truth and willingness to change one’s own 
beliefs if the force of another’s evidence and arguments prevail” (p. 12). Thus, one fulfills 
Dowding’s second “reliability condition” by caring more about truth or reasonable agreement 
than about winning the argument. 
Dowding (2018) focused on the role of emotion in non-manipulative communication. He 
offered two conditions under which an appeal to emotion is neither coercive nor manipulative. 
(3) an agent i induces individual j to assent to S at least partly through the induction 
of emotion F, and what induces F in j is also what induced emotion F in i. 
(Dowding, 2018, p. 250). 
(4) the emotions expressed by i are genuine. (Dowding, 2018, p. 251) 
As before, the idea is that persuasion is not manipulative if the grounds that the influencer offers 
are the same grounds that the influencer accepts. For example, an influencer who makes the 
target fear what the influencer does not fear would violate this condition. Moreover, the emotion 
must not only be shared, but it must be based on the same grounds. Thus, it would be a violation 
of this condition for a politician to try to get voters to share the politician’s fear of immigration 
by getting them to see immigrants as potential criminals, when the politician’s own fear of 
immigration is based on the prospect of immigrants gaining citizenship and supporting the 
opposing party. 
The addition of an emotional component to Dowding’s theory is significant because many 
cases of political manipulation involve appeals to emotions. If the Willie Horton or Daisy ads are 
manipulative, this is presumably at least in part because of the way they appeal to emotion. 
When Iago manipulates Othello, he does so in large part by playing on Othello’s emotions. 
Appeals to hatred, fear, and xenophobia to sell the public on an aggressive war seem to be 
manipulative precisely because of the way they appeal to emotions. But there are also appeals to 
emotion that do not seem manipulative at all—at least if that term’s normal connotation of moral 
disapprobation is to be maintained. Evoking sympathy for the disadvantaged does not seem 
manipulative. Many of Churchill’s most celebrated World War II speeches were designed to stir 
the emotions, but it seems implausible to say that this made them manipulative. Government 
campaigns to warn the public about the dangers of smoking, vaping, or texting while driving 
may seek to instill emotions ranging from concern to a healthy level of fear, but it seems 
incorrect to label them as manipulative. Like some of the other bad reasons accounts, Dowding’s 
account offers the possibility of distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative appeals to 
emotion. 
However, the bad reasons account faces its own challenges. First, it appears unable to 
account for situational manipulation (especially those tactics that change the outcome without 
changing anyone’s decisions). If wrecking amendments or gerrymandering are instances of 
manipulation, then they do not seem to work by offering anyone bad reasons. It appears that the 
most that the bad reasons account can say about such tactics is that any attempt to camouflage 
them would be manipulative. It seems unable to label them as manipulation in and of themselves. 
A second challenge is that such accounts typically define manipulation in terms of the 
manipulator’s beliefs about which reasons are good or bad. This may not be a problem for a 
theory of manipulation that is meant to guide moral judgments about individuals. But at the level 
of politics, it poses a serious challenge. Many instances of putative political manipulation are 
carried out not by single individuals but by groups of individuals. A single campaign ad might be 
the work of dozens of people. Even a speech given by one politician may have many authors. 
Whose attitudes toward the reasons embodied in such a message determine whether it is 
manipulative? Must everyone involved agree that the reasons being offered are bad? Or perhaps 
the majority of those responsible for the message determines whether it is manipulative? Or 
perhaps a message is manipulative if the final decision maker, or the person delivering the 
message, regards the reasons on offer as bad ones? 
Manipulation as Heresthetic 
In his classic book, The Art of Political Manipulation, William Riker (1986) coined the term 
“heresthetic” to refer to “structuring the world so you can win” (p. ix). Riker did not offer a 
formal definition of this kind of manipulation; instead, he provided a series of detailed case 
studies. The tactics displayed in these cases include dividing one’s opposition, gerrymandering, 
and arranging the order of votes to make one’s preferred outcome more likely. These are all 
examples of situational manipulation, in particular the form that does not involve changing the 
situation in order to change what someone else does. 
A crucial feature of Riker’s account of heresthetic manipulation is that he does not see it as a 
bad thing. In his discussion of an aviation club chairperson who manipulates the club’s votes 
about which planes to lease in favor of his own preference, he noted “the absence of a general 
equilibrium of preferences” (Riker, 1986, p. 31), that is,  the fact that different voting procedures 
will often yield different outcomes, as justification for the chairperson carefully choosing the 
voting procedures to make the vote come out the way he prefers. Riker saw nothing wrong with 
this because the chairperson “could not have constructed an outcome-neutral agenda” (p. 31). It 
is not as though the chairperson is hijacking the legitimate will of the group, for there is simply 
no single answer to the question of what the group prefers in the kinds of cases where different 
agenda-orderings or different voting procedures will yield different outcomes. That being the 
case, perhaps it is not unreasonable to give the answer Riker expects to the question: “Is it not an 
odd standard to require a man to act against himself?” (Riker, 1986, pp. 31–32). However, this 
position seems less compelling when Riker (1986, pp. 76–77) applied it to gerrymandering. Even 
if, as he noted, there is no uniquely correct way to draw legislative districts, it does not follow 
that all ways of doing so are equally legitimate, or that it is equally legitimate to draw boundaries 
that disenfranchise groups of voters as to draw them in ways that make their representation more 
proportional to their numbers. Moreover, Riker (1986, pp. 73–77) seemed unbothered by the fact 
that the case of gerrymandering he discussed is accompanied by considerable subterfuge 
designed to camouflage its nature. 
Riker’s work raises several important questions. The first concerns the relationship between 
Riker’s heresthetic tactics and tactics like the Willie Horton ad. This, of course, is simply the 
question of whether psychological manipulation and situational manipulation are variants of the 
same phenomenon or different phenomena altogether. All of Riker’s examples are forms of 
situational manipulation. Moreover, they are all examples of the kind of situational manipulation 
that changes the outcome without changing anyone’s decisions. Although Riker (1986, pp. x–xi) 
distinguished heresthetic manipulation from psychological manipulation, he offered no opinion 
on how, if at all, they are related, except to say that one is persuasive while the other is strategic. 
It is possible that the most reasonable conclusion is that, contrary to ordinary linguistic 
usage, situational manipulation is quite different from psychological manipulation. Perhaps 
situational manipulation is best seen as a sort of power grab which illegitimately augments or 
exercises political power by exploiting rules that were not meant for this purpose. Perhaps 
gerrymandering or careful agenda engineering are manipulative because drawing legislative 
boundaries and setting agendas were meant to be mere administrative tasks rather than tools for 
augmenting or wielding significant political power. If so, then it seems likely that the factors that 
make heresthetic manipulation manipulative will be rather different from those that make 
psychological manipulation manipulative. On the other hand, given that such power grabs are 
typically disguised, perhaps the common view that they are manipulative involves conflating the 
intuition that attempts to disguise them are manipulative with the intuition that the tactics 
themselves are manipulative. 
To see this, consider the difference between a trick and a trap. Both are ways of getting 
someone to do something, but their mechanisms are quite different. A trap works by closing 
options that were previously open. Trickery gets the target to choose one option over others 
without eliminating any of them. But a trap works best when the target does not recognize it; 
hence, traps are typically disguised, or the prey is tricked into entering them. Perhaps it would be 
best to think of psychological manipulation as being rather like a trick, and situational 
manipulation as being more like a trap, but one which often requires trickery to work. 
In addition to this taxonomic question, another important question concerns the moral status 
of heresthetic manipulation. Is it correct, as Riker (1986) suggested, that heresthetic 
manipulation is not in itself immoral? Andrew Sabl (2011) argued that while heresthetic 
manipulation may not be immoral in the abstract, in the real world it is often accompanied by 
what he called “heresthetic overload,” which occurs “when a team of actors deliberately 
provides, or at least encourages, the release of colossal amounts of information, followed by a 
biased frame put out to make sense of it—a frame that serves the purpose of the team, not the 
audience” (p. 233). This overload is designed to obscure “how politicians are manipulating the 
available choices about policy” (Sabl, 2011, p. 233). According to Sabl, it is easier to produce 
cognitive overload with respect to the procedures exploited in heresthetic manipulation than with 
respect to the public policy issues themselves, simply because those procedures are so complex 
and arcane. Rather than trying to hide what they are up to, Sabl argued, politicians practicing 
heresthetic manipulation can simply overload the audience with so much arcane procedural 
information that most will be too bewildered to understand how politicians are exploiting it to 
get their way. Moreover, Sabl suggested, it is often simply not rational for political outsiders to 
acquire the expertise to recognize heresthetic manipulation. The result, Sabl (2011) argued, is the 
“troubling fact . . . that knowledge of political maneuvering is inherently an insiders’ game” (p. 
237). 
One might wonder, though, whether heresthetic manipulation is undesirable for reasons that 
go beyond those embodied in Sabl’s critique and the observation that psychological manipulation 
is often used to camouflage heresthetic manipulation. Scholars have thought about the normative 
implications of specific forms of heresthetic manipulation: Much has been written on 
gerrymandering as a mechanism for disenfranchisement, for example, and some works (e.g., 
Dowding & Hees, 2008) have examined the normative status of strategic voting. However, little 
work has been done to determine whether there are common normative concerns that apply to all 
forms of heresthetic manipulation, and whether they are related to the normative concerns about 
psychological manipulation. Sabl’s work is a beginning, in that he employs some of Goodin’s 
ideas about psychological manipulation in his analysis, but more work remains to be done. 
Manipulation and Autonomy 
Manipulation is generally thought to undermine the autonomy of the person being manipulated. 
Psychological manipulation gets someone to make a choice that they would not otherwise have 
made. Robert Goodin used the term “putative will” to refer to the choice that the target of 
manipulation would have made but for the manipulation. Thus, manipulation directs a person 
away from that person’s “putative will” and toward some choice that the manipulator prefers. 
Thus, to the extent that the person acted autonomously in forming a putative will, by deflecting 
the person away from it, manipulation compromises that person’s autonomy. This is not simply 
because there is a re-direction away from the target’s putative will, but because of the way that 
this re-direction occurs. After all, rational persuasion can also induce an agent to act in a way 
that the agent was not initially inclined to act. But rational persuasion does this by helping agents 
to change their putative wills to more accurately reflect facts about how best to pursue their 
preferences, or to revise those preferences in light of facts about how best to pursue their deepest 
values and aims, or to subject those deepest values and aims to rational self-reflection. These 
changes to a person’s putative will maintain, and perhaps even enhance, that person’s autonomy. 
Psychological manipulation, by contrast, induces changes to the target’s putative will, or the 
preferences upon which it is based, that do not reflect facts and good reasons. Such changes 
make the target’s putative will less reflective of, and less likely to achieve or express, the target ’s 
deepest values and aims. 
Situational or heresthetic manipulation does not undermine the target’s autonomy during the 
process by which the target forms a putative will. Rather, it limits the target’s autonomy by 
closing off options that might have been chosen by the target’s autonomously formed putative 
will. Thus, this form of manipulation is perhaps better seen as limiting or impeding the target’s 
autonomy, since it limits the target’s ability to pursue a putative will rather than undermining the 
target’s autonomy in forming a putative will. 
Nudges and Libertarian Paternalism 
Concerns about manipulation and its effects on autonomy arise in debates about the “nudges” 
championed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. Thaler and Sunstein (2009) characterized 
nudges as minor interventions designed to help people make better choices—where “better” is 
judged from the perspective of the person being nudged. However, if nudges provide these 
benefits by means that are manipulative and thus undermine autonomy, they may nevertheless be 
undesirable. 
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) referred to their advocacy of nudges as “libertarian paternalism.” 
It is paternalistic in that they only advocate nudges that “influence choice in a way that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, p. 5). They argued that it 
is libertarian because nudges are weak and easily resisted influences; thus, when they are 
deployed, “choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened” (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2009, p. 5). 
The nudges Thaler and Sunstein (2009) advocated come in many forms. Some merely 
provide better and clearer information about such things as food nutritional qualities and the 
details of mortgages and credit cards. Others help people stick to their commitments, by making 
it more difficult to undo a decision to save for retirement, for example. These nudges do not 
seem to raise serious concerns about manipulation, nor is it even clear that they should count as 
paternalistic (Hausman & Welch, 2010, pp. 127–128). 
However, other sorts of nudges employ psychological mechanisms that do raise concerns 
about manipulation. These nudges often work by affecting the relative salience of the available 
options or by harnessing various reasoning and decision-making biases. Consider these 
examples: First, a benevolent cafeteria manager arranges the offerings so that more healthful 
options are displayed more prominently, in order to make customers more likely to choose them. 
Second, a benevolent human resources manager arranges for employees to be enrolled in a 
retirement savings plan unless they opt out, counting on the decision-making bias in favor of the 
status quo to make employees more likely to remain enrolled in the savings plan that is in their 
long-term financial interests. 
Nudges like these raise concerns about manipulation. To the extent that they work, they 
appear to harness forms of psychological influence of which their targets are not aware, and 
which do not seem to provide good reasons for the choices that they make more likely. Thus, 
there is reason to worry that, as Till Grüne-Yanoff (2012) wrote: 
Such steering policies are manipulative, first because the government employs 
them with the intention of affecting people’s choices. Secondly because they 
deliberately circumvent people’s rational reasoning and deliberating faculties, and 
instead seek to influence their choices through knowledge of the biases to which 
they are susceptible. (p. 636) 
Proponents of libertarian paternalism respond in various ways. One is to reiterate that the only 
nudges they endorse are ones that help people satisfy their pre-existing preferences. However, as 
Mark White (2013, pp. 61–80) argued, this reply faces a serious epistemic problem: How can the 
nudger be sure what interests each of the targets of a given nudge really have? Against this 
worry, Thomas R. V. Nys and Bart Engelen (2017, p. 204) suggested that because nudges only 
exert weak influences, anyone who does not have a pre-existing preference for what the nudge 
helps them choose will simply resist that weak influence. 
Defenders of nudges also claim that nudges are not problematic because everyone is already 
bombarded with influences similar in kind and magnitude to those introduced by nudges (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2009, pp. 10–11). However, the fact that a certain kind of force is already acting on 
an agent does not entail that it is unproblematic deliberately to deploy a similar force to influence 
that agent: The mere fact that people are already getting jostled about on a crowded train car 
certainly does not prove that it is unproblematic to jostle someone deliberately to move the 
person where you like. 
Others defend nudges against charges of manipulation by claiming that they are best seen as 
recommendations (Levy, 2019), or that, contrary to initial appearances, nudges support rather 
than undermine or bypass rationality (Schmidt, 2019). Still others argue that while some nudges 
may be somewhat manipulative, their potential to help their targets makes them justified on 
balance (Hanna, 2015; Moles, 2015; Nys & Engelen, 2017). On this view, even if nudges are 
manipulative, and even if that fact counts as a pro tanto reason to avoid them, the good that they 
can do in the lives of their targets outweighs the moral reason that one normally has to avoid 
engaging in manipulation. 
A final worry about nudges, which has yet to receive much attention, concerns their 
aggregate effects. To see this worry, consider the famous critique of advertising put forward by 
John Kenneth Galbraith (1958). In addition to his well-known contention that advertising allows 
businesses to create consumer demand for products it wants to produce, Galbraith also worried 
about the aggregate effect of advertising. He suggested that the effect of an environment suffused 
with advertising warps consumers’ more general preferences in favor of private consumption and 
away from public goods. This second (alleged) effect of advertising is not the effect of any single 
ad, but rather an overall effect of pervasive advertising. In a similar way, one might worry that, 
even if an individual nudge does not manipulate the target’s underlying preferences, an 
environment suffused with nudges might do so. 
The question whether at least some nudges are manipulative, and whether this makes them 
incompatible on balance with free society, remains very much open. Progress in this debate will 
require careful distinctions among different sorts of nudges, a better understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms by which they operate, and a greater consensus about the nature of 
manipulation and the conditions under which it may be justified. 
Manipulation and Democracy 
Because manipulation is a form of power, it may occur in any political system. Indeed, it is an 
especially useful tool for authoritarian regimes, since they must maintain public support , or at 
least acquiescence, despite their authoritarianism. The potential for manipulation in democracies 
was recognized by the ancients. Ancient critics of democracy often pointed to its susceptibility to 
influences that could be characterized as manipulation. As Terrence Ball (2011) wrote: 
one of the stock weapons in the arsenal of aristocrats and other opponents of 
democracy is the assertion that, of all forms of government, democracy is the most 
open to manipulation—to disinformation, appeals to prejudice, and the 
machinations of demagogues. (p. 43)  
Such critiques are prominent when Aristotle (1998) discussed how democracies are liable to 
descend into tyranny in Book V of the Politics. And in Book V (chapter 97) of his Histories, 
Herodotus (2014) opined that Aristagoras failed in getting the Spartan king to agree to help the 
Ionians against Persia, but succeeded in getting Athens to do so, because a group is more easily 
deceived than a single person. Interestingly, such critiques point not only to deception and 
disinformation, but also to stirring up of emotion and desires for such things as honor and gain. 
For these ancient critics of democracy, the possibility of manipulation is a practical concern: 
Manipulation might lead to bad decisions, such as empowering tyrants or undertaking unwise 
wars. But the possibility of manipulation raises important theoretical concerns for any political 
system that derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Such concerns are magnified 
in any system where citizens participate in choosing leaders, passing laws, and setting policy. 
Hence, they are of special concern in democracies. 
Where the decisions of citizens have been influenced by manipulation, questions will arise 
as to whether they confer political legitimacy in the way that democratic theory assumes. As 
James Fishkin (2011) wrote, “If one believes that public will formation is potentially meaningful, 
then manipulation is objectionable, because it is intended to distort the public will for the sake of 
political advantage” (p. 37). This is not merely the practical problem that voters can be 
manipulated into making bad decisions. Rather, it strikes at the core of democratic theory, 
namely the idea that the government should reflect the will of the people. As Assef Sharon 
(2019) wrote: 
The problem then is not that people’s judgments will be uninformed, irrational, or 
self-interested, but that they do not, properly speaking, constitute judgments at all; 
they express no independent will. (p. 368) 
To the extent that voters’ choices are manipulated, they do not seem to express the autonomous, 
independent decisions that are supposed to be the foundation for democratic political legitimacy. 
Even worse, to the extent that governing elites manipulate the public, government may be 
molding public opinion rather than responding to it and deriving legitimacy from doing so. 
Some scholars who have taken this problem seriously have suggested that it is a reason to 
prefer deliberative forms of democracy. Thus, Fishkin (2011) wrote that: 
Avoiding manipulation, one is led to deliberation—to at least some degree and in 
some institutional contexts by or on behalf of the people. The cure for Madison 
Avenue is a dose of Madison. (p. 40) 
Not everyone is convinced that deliberative democracy is a panacea for the perils of 
manipulation, however. Sharon (2019) urged caution: 
If opinion is controlled and the will expressed by the public is manufactured, then 
the very foundation of deliberative democracy—to constitute a form of self-
government—is compromised. . . . In fact, popular engagement in political 
discussion might only make things worse: The circumstances of public discussion 
create the conditions for the manipulation of public opinion and are thus an 
impediment to collective self-government rather than its realization. (p. 368) 
Thus, deliberative democracy faces two distinct challenges: First, the opinions and values that 
citizens bring to the deliberative context may already be warped by manipulation. Second, the 
deliberative process may simply become a forum for more manipulation. Meeting this challenge 
would seem to require a very robust notion of deliberation, one that not only excludes 
manipulative communications during the process of deliberation, but also counteracts the effects 
of manipulation on the opinions that the participants in deliberation bring into the process. 
These challenges set the stage for Keith Dowding’s theory of manipulation (which is 
discussed in more detail in the section “Manipulation as Offering Bad Reasons”). Although 
Dowding (2011, 2016) emphasized how his “reliability conditions” exclude manipulative tactics 
from the process of deliberation, one might hope that the conditions requiring deliberators to aim 
at finding the truth (even if that requires revising one’s own opinion) rather than winning the 
argument by any means might allow deliberators to see through any manipulation to which they 
were subjected before the deliberation began. 
Of course, adding conditions to deliberation might exacerbate the problems that deliberative 
democracy already faces, such as the difficulty of reconciling the values of democratic 
inclusiveness with the rigors required for genuine deliberation (Parkinson, 2003). Perhaps, 
though, this problem can be mitigated by recognizing, as Nathanial Klemp (2011) urged, that 
there is a middle ground between the ideal form of deliberative persuasion and manipulation. 
Klemp (2011) called this middle ground “strategic persuasion,” and he argued that while it is not 
the ideal form of political communication, it “neither diminishes nor enhances democracy in 
significant ways” and “plays a legitimate role in politics but is less desirable than deliberative 
persuasion” (p. 79). 
Manipulation and Twenty-First-Century Democratic Politics 
Questions about whether it is possible to construct an ideal form of democratic deliberation 
which is free of manipulation and capable of undoing prior manipulation lead naturally to the 
question of how much manipulation exists in 21st-century democratic politics. 
Unfortunately, there are grounds for pessimism on this question. These grounds go beyond 
the fact that examples of manipulation in 21st-century politics are easy to identify. The 
existence—even ubiquity—of political messaging that ranges from borderline to clearly 
manipulative is not a new phenomenon. Much of the easily spotted manipulation in 21st-century 
politics involves variations on the same tactics that have raised concerns all the way back to 
ancient critics of rhetoric. What is both distinctive and potentially more worrisome in the 21st-
century political landscape is that advances in technology and in the understanding of 
psychology provide new and perhaps more potent tools for the manipulator. As William Gorton 
(2016) argued, 
Methodological and technological developments in the behavioral social sciences 
and related fields, in conjunction with marketing techniques . . ., are beginning to 
produce the power to manipulate, in fairly precise and predictable ways, 
individuals’ beliefs and behaviors. (p. 62) 
Of particular concern are findings from cognitive and behavioral psychology that improve the 
power to predict ever more precisely how the framing of a message will affect how it is received, 
independent of its propositional content. Of course, it has long been known that it matters how a 
message is phrased: Ancient teachers of rhetoric warned their students to choose their words 
carefully, and George Orwell (2013) famously analyzed the political power of euphemism. But 
advances in psychology and the social sciences have greatly increased the sophistication by 
which communicators can choose words, metaphors, and ways of framing messages to maximize 
their influence. 
A pioneer in this regard is Frank Luntz (2008), who used focus groups to craft messaging for 
the U.S. Republican Party, most famously advocating replacing the neutral phrase “estate tax” 
with the emotionally laden term “death tax.” Another is the liberal scholar-activist George 
Lakoff, who drew on work in cognitive science to suggest different ways of framing key issues 
on which liberals seek to increase political support (Lakoff et al., 2004). As Gorton (2016) 
argued, such tactics are potentially manipulative inasmuch as they involve “intentionally and 
precisely targeting their unconscious cognitive processes” so that the message “alters a person’s 
beliefs and attitudes without her knowing why or how her beliefs and attitudes have changed” (p. 
75). 
Operatives like Lakoff and Luntz employed cognitive and social psychology to hack the 
human mind in search of levers to influence attitudes and opinion. Larger-scale, more 
quantitative social science techniques are also yielding tools by which politicians can influence 
voters’ opinions and attitudes in ways that raise concerns about manipulation. Gorton (2016) 
discussed well-known political science field experiments which appear to have changed voter 
behavior by using “canned messages” rather than “sincere attempts to use reason and evidence to 
persuade citizens to vote” (p. 67). In language reminiscent of the characterization of the 
manipulator as being “interested in reasons not as logical justifiers but as causal levers” (Mills, 
1995, pp. 100–101), Gorton (2016) wrote that “the messages’ value is purely a function of their 
power to prod people to the polls. The content of the argument or evidence in the message does 
not matter as such; all that matters is that the message ‘works’” (p. 67). 
Gorton (2016) also worried about the manipulative potential for using data mining to predict 
the effectiveness of political messaging: 
Big data’s ability to comb through enormous amounts of data . . . offers the promise 
of much greater predictive power compared with the random sampling methods of 
traditional statistical analysis. . . . Importantly, such analysis can be conducted 
absent any theory or hypothesis linking causes and effects. . . . As such, big data 
offers—indeed, boasts of—the power to predict without understanding. (p. 73) 
One way that this happens is through “microtargeting,” that is, slicing the electorate into ever 
more specialized groups and tailoring political messaging to those groups, based on what the 
data-mining algorithms predict will be most effective. This process has a further consequence, 
especially as the number of slices grows. As Gorton (2016) wrote: 
In addition to producing highly individualized messages, microtargeting produces 
messages that can more easily fly under the radar of the press and the broader 
public, markedly increasing their power to mislead and misinform viewers with 
impunity. . . . Reporters and independent fact-checking organizations simply lack 
the time and resources to monitor all the microtargeted messaging. (p. 72) 
Gorton’s worries about micro-targeting of political messages parallel a worry about the 
fragmentation of news media. As citizens increasingly tune to politicized news media that match 
their political views—the so-called “echo chamber”—they make themselves vulnerable to 
manipulation either perpetrated or allowed by those very media. Whether and to what extent a 
politicized media operation is inherently manipulative depends on how the line is drawn between 
“mere spin” and outright manipulation. But even where a partisan news media is not itself 
engaging in manipulation, it is probably less likely to help its viewers recognize manipulation by 
politicians in its own ideological camp. In a healthy democracy, one role of the free press is to 
provide a bulwark against manipulation; but this is a role that a partisan media is less likely to 
play—or play vigorously—when the manipulation comes from its own side. 
Journalistic ethics may provide some guardrails here: Journalists at conservative Fox News 
debunked Donald Trump’s false claims that the 2020 U.S. election was “stolen,” even as those 
false claims were being repeated on the opinion side of that same network. But the increasing 
fragmentation of the media makes it easier to find an audience for a news organization populated 
by people with fewer ethical scruples than Fox’s news division journalists. Ironically, charges of 
manipulation can themselves be used to accelerate this process: Charges that the “mainstream 
media” is a purveyor of “fake news” may drive conservative viewers to ever more partisan right-
wing news media, just as charges that “mainstream media” is an engine of capitalist ideology 
may drive liberal viewers to ever more partisan left-wing news media. 
Clearly, then, there is much about the 21st-century political climate to trigger worries about 
political manipulation. Although it seems relatively uncontroversial that manipulation 
undermines democratic legitimacy, determining whether any given tactic or development is 
genuinely manipulative requires more careful analysis of the concept of manipulation, and how it 
is to be distinguished from persuasion and zealous but honest advocacy for one’s own political 
views. 
The Continuing Theoretical and Practical Significance of Manipulation 
The concept of manipulation is important to political theory for several reasons. The prospect of 
manipulation poses challenges both to understanding and to achieving political legitimacy on any 
theory or form of government that asserts that legitimacy flows from the autonomous consent of 
the governed. At the level of practice, the fact that manipulation seems undesirable creates 
challenges for understanding how governments and political actors can remain on the right side 
of the line between effective persuasion and autonomy-undermining manipulation. Yet the 
concept of manipulation remains poorly understood. While there are several theories of 
manipulation, each of them faces serious challenges. Hence, important questions remain both for 
understanding what manipulation is, and for addressing the theoretical and practical challenges 
posed by manipulation for both the theory and practice of politics. 
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